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Abstract
Most doctors in the NRMP match with one of their most-preferred internship pro-
grams. However, surveys indicate doctors’ preferences are similar, suggesting a puzzle:
how can so many doctors match with their top choices when positions are scarce? We
provide one possible explanation. We show that the patterns in the NRMP data may be
an artifact of the interview process that precedes the match. Our study highlights the
importance of understanding market interactions occurring before and after a matching
clearinghouse, and casts doubts on analyses of clearinghouses that take reported prefer-
ences at face value.
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The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) has matched millions of doc-
tors to residency programs across the United States. In 2020 alone, 45,000 active
applicants matched to over 37,000 positions. Match results reported by the NRMP
for 2020 suggest comforting news for doctors: 46.3% of freshly-minted MDs from
US schools were matched to their first-ranked choice, while 71.1% were matched
to one of their top-three choices. The most-recent year’s figures are by no means
an aberration. The fraction of applicants matched to their first-ranked choice has
been at least as high over the past two decades. We suggest these surprising figures
should not be taken at face value. In particular, we show that interactions outside
of the main match—through the interview process that precedes it—-may be at
least as important as the matching protocol itself.
Why should a very large fraction of doctors matching to their top-ranked res-
idencies be surprising? The algorithm governing the NRMP match implements a
stable matching over the reported preferences. If applicants report similar pref-
erences, only a few applicants can get their most-preferred option. For example,
suppose we wish to match 100 prospective residents to 100 positions. Common
preferences on both sides (an assortative market) yield an outcome where just 1%
of doctors are matched to their first-ranked program. As we show, even a small
common component in doctors’ preferences implies relatively few matches to top-
ranked hospitals.
One explanation for the NRMP outcome data is that applicants’ preferences
are diametrically opposed, with a handful of applicants ranking each position as
their top outcome. This stands in the face of survey data and preference estima-
tions suggesting important preference commonalities (see Rees-Jones, 2018; Agar-
wal, 2015). Another explanation might be that preferences are independent, or
even somewhat correlated, across participants but that each doctor and hospital
consider only k of their top partners as acceptable, as in Immorlica and Mahdian
(2015), and submit those preferences truthfully. Matched participants would then
have to receive one of their top-k partners. As we show, this explanation too has
shortcomings. First, it does not explain the relative prevalence of matches with
the first-ranked partner. Second, for small k—which is arguably the case in the
NRMP, where doctors commonly rank fewer than 20 programs—many applicants
remain unmatched under truncation to the top-k partners (see also Arnosti, 2015;
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Beyhaghi and Tardos, 2018; Lee, 2016).
We propose another story. Prior to the NRMP, applicants interview with hos-
pitals. The determination of who interviews with whom is decentralized with two
important features. First, interviewing is costly, and capacities are limited. Second,
hospitals and doctors submit rankings to the NRMP only for those they interviewed
with.1
We assume that hospitals and prospective residents’ preferences are decompos-
able into common and idiosyncratic components. For hospitals, the common com-
ponent can reflect doctors’ academic performance and test scores (Agarwal, 2015).
For doctors, it can reflect hospital rankings, quality of life in the local area, etc.
In contrast, the idiosyncratic component reflects match-specific values. Assuming
this preference form, we consider a pre-match interview-selection process. Each
hospital has a maximum number of interview slots, k, while each candidate has
a limit on the number of interviews they can attend, k′. The decentralized inter-
view outcome is then modeled as a stable many-to-many matching under the (k,k′)
capacity constraints. At the centralized matching stage, only interview partners’
ranks are reported, which we refer to as the “interview-truncated” preferences.
The truncation induced by the interview process necessarily narrows agents’
original preferences. Nonetheless, since hospitals’ and doctors’ preferences are
linked through stability of the interview process, a large fraction of prospective
doctors still end up matched. Moreover, reported ranks for match outcomes are
much higher than in the untruncated preferences.
The presence of a common component in prospective residents’ preferences is
crucial for this conclusion. In particular, we show that with sufficient disagree-
ment in doctors’ preferences, interviews may cause matched partners’ reported
rank to go down, not up. While perfect agreement among the doctors over hospital
rankings implies that interviews lead to inflated rankings for matched programs,
this obviously represents an extreme.2 Our main theoretical finding is that in large
markets, an arbitrarily weak common component is sufficient for interviews to gen-
erate the pattern of high-reported ranks for match partners.
As our most-general result is asymptotic, we complement it with simulations
1The 2019 NRMP Applicant Survey (available from nrmp.org) reports on four types of median
respondents in 21 specialties (anesthesiology, pediatrics, etc.). Of the 84 medians reported, 63 have
perfectly coincident numbers for interviews attended and programs ranked, where 81 are ±1.
2A related idea appears in Beyhaghi and Tardos (2018), who show that interviews may increase
the size of a match. See also Kadam (2015).
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at more moderate market sizes. Not only do our simulation results strongly mirror
the NRMP outcome reports (unmatched fraction, distribution of submitted rank-
ings), they also provide a strong link with one of the other main findings in the
literature, that of small-cores in Roth and Peranson (1999).3
The idea that doctors’ reports in the residency match may not reflect true
preferences is certainly present in other work. Hassidim, Marciano, Romm, and
Shorrer (2017) survey evidence of misreports in the NRMP, suggesting four possi-
ble explanations: proposers’ failure to identify the dominant strategy, mistrust in
the mechanism, non-classical utility, and self-selection. The last of these is clos-
est to the mechanism in our paper. In this vein Chen and Pereyra (2019) consider
school-choice problems where students “self select” by only ranking schools they
believe will plausibly admit them, showing evidence for this self-selection in Mexi-
can high-school applications. While doctors and hospitals only ranking those they
interview with is a manifestation of self-selection, our theoretical analysis offers a
constructive process to shed light on this process and its impact on outcomes.4
Our results have important implications for the NRMP, and the matching lit-
erature more broadly. Doctors participating in the deferred-acceptance algorithm
underlying the match have incentives to truthfully report preferences (Roth and
Peranson, 1999). Traditionally, economists have viewed the NRMP as an ideal
case-study in strategy-proof design. Our findings suggest that because reported
preferences in the NRMP are filtered through the interview stage, they should be
interpreted with caution. In particular, reported high-rank matches cannot be
read literally, and any conclusions drawn about welfare using estimated prefer-
ences from the match itself are suspect. This message is particularly stark given
that our paper ignores strategic effects at interviews.5
3In an environment with fully idiosyncratic preferences, Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno (2017)
show that imbalanced markets lead to high reported ranks for the short side of the market—at the
aggregate level for the NRMP, the hospital side.
4Lee and Schwarz (2017) also consider an interview process that precedes a centralized match.
In their setting, workers are fully informed of their preferences, while firms view workers symmet-
rically at the outset and use costly interviews to infer their own preferences. In the NRMP context,
Rees-Jones (2018) uses surveys to illustrate doctors’ significant “misreporting” in the match, while
Rees-Jones and Skowronek (2018) uses an online experiment with post-match medical students
where 23 percent misrepresent their preferences in an incentivized NRMP-like matching task.
5See Beyhaghi, Saban, and Tardos (2017) for an analysis of the strategic implications of inter-
views.
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2 Setting Up the Puzzle
We first argue that standard preference assumptions on the match process are at
odds with observed outcomes in the NRMP data. We focus on two key measures.
First, across two decades of annual matches, approximately one half of all matched
residents obtain their first-ranked outcome.6 This holds not only for matched US
MD seniors (residents graduating with an MD from a US medical school), but also
for matched independent applicants (those from DO-granting schools, or based
outside of the US) who match at lower rates. Second, Roth and Peranson demon-
strate that reported rank-order lists exhibit small cores. That is, in a shift from
doctor-proposing to hospital-proposing deferred acceptance (DA), they show that
only 0.1% of doctors have different outcomes. Taking the reported preferences at
face value, this means that the vast majority (99.9%) have a unique stable-match
partner: a small core.
To gain intuition for which preferences can generate these patterns, consider
a two-sided matching market with N = 100 participants on each side. For each
doctor d and hospital h, the respective cardinal-match utilities are given by:
ud(h) = λ
D · ch + (1−λD) · ηd,h and uh(d) = λH · cd + (1−λH ) · ηh,d .
For the ch (cd) terms we draw i.i.d. N (0,1) random variables to represent common-
utility components of matching with each hospital (doctor). The η terms represent
idiosyncratic terms, again i.i.d. N (0,1) random variables. Finally, λH and λD rep-
resent the relative weights on the common and idiosyncratic utility components
for each side of the market.
We form analogs to the two features of NRMP outcomes using 500 DA sim-
ulations with the above preference assumptions. Figure 1(a) indicates the sim-
ulated fraction of doctors matched to their first-ranked program under doctor-
proposing DA, while Figure 1(b) depicts the fraction with the same partner under
both doctor- and hospital-proposing DA. On the horizontal axis we vary the hos-
pitals’ common-component weight, where each plotted curve varies the doctors’
common-component weight.
Having almost half of the doctors attain their first-ranked match, and almost
all with a unique stable-match partner, is attained at an extreme for the preference
6See Figure B.1 in the Online Appendix for details.
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(a) Top-ranked matches (b) Unique stable-partner
Figure 1: Simulated DA outcomes
weights. This happens when hospitals’ preferences are driven almost entirely by
the common component (λH close to one) and doctors’ preferences by the idiosyn-
cratic component (λD close to zero).
Hospitals having a strong common component is consistent with NRMP sur-
vey data.7. However, the requirement that doctors’ preferences are almost com-
pletely idiosyncratic contradicts ample survey evidence. The NRMP’s 2019 post-
match resident survey suggests that common-value components (“reputation of
program,” having an “academic medical center program,” as well as quality of the
residents, faculty, and educational curriculum) are cited at similar frequencies to
idiosyncratic ones (“perceived goodness of fit" and “geographic location”) as rea-
sons for ranking programs.
We next show theoretically how the interview process can help reconcile these
observations. We then use simulations to connect our framework with the empiri-
cal regularities observed in the NRMP.




Our model is a variant of the standard two-sided matching model (see, for exam-
ple, Roth and Sotomayor, 1990), with an added interview stage.
3.1 Basic Definitions
A market is a triple (H,D,U ), where: H is a finite set of hospitals; D is a finite set of
doctors; and U = ((ud)d∈D , (uh)h∈H ) is utility function profile (with ud : H ∪ {d} → R
and uh :D ∪ {h} → R for each d and h).
A utility ua induces an ordinal preference a over the relevant set of alterna-
tives, where we assume throughout that the resulting ordinal preferences are strict.
The rank-order of b in ua is one plus the number of b′ with ua(b′) > ua(b)—so that a
lower rank-order indicates a better ordinal outcome/higher ranking. In particular,
agent a’s most-preferred match partner has rank-order 1. An agent b is unaccept-
able for a if ua(a) > ua(b).
A matching is a function µ : H ∪D → H ∪D, with the properties that µ(h) ∈
D ∪{h}, µ(d) ∈H ∪{d}, and µ(d) = h iff µ(h) = d. A matching µ is stable for a market
(H,D,U ) if ua(µ(a)) ≥ ua(a) for all a ∈ D ∪H , and there is no (d,h) ∈ D ×H with
ud(h) > ud(µ(d)) and uh(d) > uh(µ(h)).
A many-to-many matching is a function µ : H ∪D → 2H∪D with the properties
that µ(d) ⊆ H , µ(h) ⊆ D, and h ∈ µ(d) iff d ∈ µ(h). When an agent a is unassigned,
we have µ(a) = ∅. Given a pair of positive integers (k,k′), a many-to-many matching
µ is pairwise stable for (k,k′) if
•
∣∣∣µ(d)∣∣∣ ≤ k and there is no h ∈ µ(d) with ud(h) < ud(d);
•
∣∣∣µ(h)∣∣∣ ≤ k′ and there is no d ∈ µ(h) with uh(d) < uh(h);
• There is no (h,d) such that d < µ(h) and any one of the following:
– ud(h) > ud(h′) and uh(d) > uh(d′) for some (h′,d′) ∈ µ(d)×µ(h);
– ud(h) > ud(h′), uh(d) > uh(h), and
∣∣∣µ(h)∣∣∣ < k′ for some h′ ∈ µ(d);
– ud(h) > ud(d), uh(d) > uh(d′), and
∣∣∣µ(d)∣∣∣ < k for some d′ ∈ µ(h).
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3.2 Interview Schedules
In our model, doctors and hospitals first schedule interviews and then participate
in the match.
An interview schedule is a many-to-many matching. Given a pair of integers
(k,k′), a (k,k′)-constrained interview schedule is a many-to-many matching µ with∣∣∣µ(d)∣∣∣ ≤ k and ∣∣∣µ(h)∣∣∣ ≤ k′ for all d and h. Each doctor can interview with at most k
hospitals, and each hospital can interview at most k′ doctors.
Given an interview schedule µ, agents’ interview-truncated preferences are de-
termined by setting ua(b) < ua(a) for all b < µ(a). That is, interview-truncated pref-
erences rank all interviewed agents as in the original preferences, and set all other
agents as unacceptable.
The timing in our model is then: (i) An interview schedule is determined as
the doctor-optimal many-to-many (k,k′)-stable matching;8 (ii) Doctors and hospi-
tals report their interview-truncated preferences as inputs into doctor-proposing
DA. This process’ outcome is therefore the doctor-optimal stable matching on
the interview-truncated preferences. We term this two-step process Int-DA: the
Interview process followed by Deferred Acceptance.
A doctor-optimal interview schedule can be found algorithmically using the
“T-algorithm” (see Blair, 1988; Fleiner, 2003; Echenique and Oviedo, 2006). We
assume it is the result of a decentralized interview scheduling process. One may
imagine several reasons why an interview schedule might be unstable. Our focus
is on the tension between a “pure” application of DA, and one that is preceded by
interviews. Assuming a stable outcome at the interview stage provides us with a
simple, tractable model.9
We denote the final matching from Int-DA as µI . We will compare the Int-DA
matching to that obtained from the doctor-proposing DA algorithm using agents’
original preferences, µDA.
8Arguably, the doctor-optimal stable matching at the interview stage yields a smaller difference
between reported and actual ranks than other selections of stable matchings.
9In one-to-one matching markets, experimental evidence suggests decentralized interactions
yield stable outcomes at high rates, see Echenique and Yariv (2013). Melcher, Ashlagi, and Wapnir
(2018) propose a stable-matching algorithm for internship interviews. For more on the theory of
many-to-many matching, see Sotomayor (1999); Konishi and Ünver (2006).
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3.3 Interviews can increase rank-orders
In general, interviews alone cannot explain the findings in the data: Int-DA does
not necessarily yield better-ranked partners in submitted preferences.
As a simple example, consider a matching market with three doctors, {d1,d2,d3},
and four hospitals, {h1,h2,h3,h4} (it is easy to concoct slightly more complicated ex-
amples with the same number of doctors and hospitals). Hospitals’ preferences are
common: they all prefer d1 to d2, d2 to d3, and d3 to staying unmatched. Doctors’
rank all hospitals as acceptable, with preferences given by (first to last):
d1: h1, h3, h2, h4;
d2: h2, h3, h1, h4;
d3: h3, h1, h4, h2.
Under DA, di matches to hi . So the rank-order of d3’s match is 1.
Suppose interview constraints are k = k′ = 2. All doctors want to interview with
h3, but only d1 and d2 are able to. The resulting interview schedule is: d1 with h1
and h3; d2 with h2 and h3; and d3 with h1 and h4.
Given the interview-truncated preferences, di matches with hi for i = 1,2, but
h3 is matched with d4. Thus, the Int-DA rank-order of d3’s match is 2. Hence, the
rank of d3’s partner in the presence of interviews is strictly worse than the rank of
her partner under DA when no interviews take place. In fact, the outcome under
Int-DA is unstable for the original preferences.
In this example, there is substantial disagreement between doctors’ prefer-
ences. Indeed, there are no pairwise comparisons of hospitals {h1,h2,h3} on which
doctors agree. In what follows, we show that some agreement on hospitals’ rank-
ings rules out such examples, and interviews can explain observed high match
ranks.
3.4 Interviews with Common Preference Components
Our discussion of the NRMP data emphasized the role of common components
in doctors’ and hospitals’ preferences. Our first theoretical result (Proposition 1)
confirms that, indeed, if doctors agree on hospitals’ ranking, interviews improve
observed match ranks in the succeeding clearinghouse. Our second result (Propo-
sition 2) shows that, as long as there is a common-value component in agents’
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preferences, however small, the message of our first result holds in large markets.
Finally, we illustrate convergence rates for the large-market result (Proposition 3).
Aligned Preferences
We start with the extreme case where doctors’ preferences are common.
Proposition 1. Suppose k = k′ and that doctors’ preferences are identical. For any
doctor d, the rank-order of µI (d) in her interview-truncated preference is always weakly
lower than the rank-order of µDA(d) in her actual preference d .
The proof appears in the Online Appendix. Intuitively, when doctors’ prefer-
ences are common, only one of the doctors under DA is matched to the highest-
ranked hospital, one to the second-highest, etc. In particular, n − k doctors are
matched to a hospital ranked below their top k. In contrast, interviews allow for
presorting of doctors to hospitals they have a chance of matching with. Interviews
also limit how low a matched hospital can be ranked in the reported preferences:
it can never be lower than k.
The proposition assumes k = k′, mainly for expository reasons. In our main
result below we allow for the two bounds to differ. We also show that simple
truncation of preferences submitted to DA, absent interviews, cannot explain the
gamut of stylized facts suggested by NRMP data.
Large Markets
We expand the model to account for market size, and for randomly generated
preferences. For each n, let (Dn,Hn,Un) denote a market, where Dn = {d1, . . . ,dn},
Hn = {h1, . . . ,hn} and each utility function is randomly drawn with a common-value
and idiosyncratic component. As before, suppose that
und (h) = λ
Dch + (1−λD)ηd,h and unh (d) = λ
Hcd + (1−λH )ηh,d ,
for all d ∈ Dn and h ∈ Hn, where λD ,λH ∈ (0,1). Suppose, moreover, that una (a) = 0.
The common-value components ch and cd are crucial for our results, but need not
dominate doctors’ utilities, so λD ,λH > 0 can be arbitrarily small.
Suppose that ch, cd , ηd,h and ηh,d are all drawn from an absolutely continuous
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distribution with support [0,1].10 Let µIn denote the matching resulting from the
Int-DA process in the n-sized market, and µDAn the corresponding outcome of the
doctor-proposing DA; these matchings are random and depend on the realized
utilities, omitting the explicit dependence on (c,η).
The Int-DA procedure determines a matching µIn by choosing a (kn, k
′
n)-constrained
interview schedule µ̂ as the doctor-optimal many-to-many stable matching, fol-
lowed by the doctor-proposing DA using the induced preferences.
Proposition 2. Suppose that limsupkn/n < 1 and let ε,θ > 0. The probability of the
following event converges to 1 as n → ∞: For a fraction of at least 1 − θ of doctors
d ∈ Dn, the rank-order of µIn(d) in d’s interview-truncated preference is strictly below
the rank-order of µDAn (d) in d’s actual preference d .
A fully formal statement, and the proof of Proposition 2, appear in the Ap-
pendix.
The idea underlying the proposition is simple. Consider DA and let ε > 0. By
Lee (2016), when n is large, with high probability, the setAn(ε, (c,η)) of doctors that
are within ε of their “target” assortative utility in DA account for at least 1 − θ/2
of all doctors. Let B(cd ,n) be the event that fewer than kn hospitals give doctor
d a utility greater than d’s target utility. We denote by βn the probability that a
fraction of at least θ/2 doctors have a “small” number (at most kn) of hospitals





∣∣∣An(ε, (c,η))∣∣∣ ≥ 1−θ/2) > 1 − π/2. Thus, the event that B(cd ,n) is false
for a fraction ≥ 1 − θ/2 of doctors and 1n |An(ε, (c,ε))| ≥ 1 − θ/2, has probability
≥ (1 − π/2) + (1 − π/2) − 1 = 1 − π. At the intersection of these conditions, for a
fraction ≥ (1−θ/2) + (1−θ/2)−1 = 1−θ of d ∈Dn, we have that B(cd ,n) is false and
d ∈ An(ε). Hence, for a fraction ≥ 1− θ of d ∈ Dn there are more than kn hospitals
above their target utility, and they are within ε of their target utilities.
Finally, we note that convergence rates for the large-market result in Proposi-
tion 2 are modest, with (poly-)logarithmic or polynomial growth in the relevant
“approximation guarantees” θ and π. In words, the market size needed for Propo-
sition 2 does not grow too quickly with the approximation guarantees. This mes-
sage complements the simulations in Section 4, which assume (arguably) realistic
10Any continuous distribution with strictly positive density and support on the positive reals
suffices.
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market sizes, and can be formalized as follows (detailed proof appears in the On-
line Appendix):
Proposition 3. The statement in Proposition 2 holds for n = Θ((ln(1/π))4) as π→ 0,
and n = Θ((1/θ)4) as θ→ 0.
4 Simulations
Our theoretical findings raise three important questions. The first regards market
size. Proposition 2 is asymptotic, and it is natural to consider whether interviews
matter for smaller, more realistic, market sizes. The second question regards un-
matched agents. One might worry that interview-truncated preferences give rise
to large numbers of unmatched participants, beyond those observed in the NRMP.
The final question regards stability.As our example in Section 3 makes clear, even
though both interview selection and DA separately produce stable outcomes, their
sequential application does not guarantee stability. Ideally, the difference between
outcomes under DA and the interview-truncated DA procedure would be small.
We address these questions using numerical simulations at two market sizes: a
small market of N = 50, and a medium market of N = 1,700.11




4 to the common com-
ponents of both hospitals and doctors (so λD = λH ).12 We conduct 340 simulations
for the N = 50 markets, and 10 simulations for N = 1,700, leading to outcome
information on 17,000 market participants at each market-size–preference-weight
pair, (N,λ).13 In each simulated market we first draw and fix market-wide prefer-
ences, and then calculate the following match outcomes:
• Doctor- and hospital-proposing deferred acceptance (DA).
• The stable interview allocation with k = k′ = 5 slots per position, followed by
11While the 2020 NRMP had 37,256 positions listed, the match breaks down into a number of
specialty sub-markets. For the 2019 NRMP outcome report (Table 13) the specialties vary in size
from 22 positions for Pediatrics/Medical Genetics (the NRMP only provide data for specialties with
more than 20 total positions) to 9,127 for Internal Medicine. The 20th and 80th percentiles across
the listed sub-markets in 2019 have 37 and 1,740 positions listed, mirroring our chosen simulation
sizes.
12In all simulations we use normally distributed common and idiosyncratic draws to derive car-
dinal preferences ud(h) and uh(d), per Section 2.
13All reported figures are averages across the simulations and doctors.
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both doctor- and hospital-proposing deferred acceptance on the interview-
truncated preferences.
• Doctor- and hospital-proposing deferred acceptance on preferences trun-
cated to the k = 5 top-ranked options(Tr-DA).
Table 1 provides outcomes from our simulations across the six (N,λ) parameter
pairs. Simulations with Tr-DA were added to distinguish the pure effect of trunca-
tion from the interview process our paper focuses on. The first panel in the table
provides three characteristics of the match outcome: (i) the fraction of unmatched
participants; (ii) the fraction of doctors matched to their first-ranked program; and
(iii) the proportion of doctors matched to a top-three–ranked program.
Because our simulated markets have the same participant volume on each side,
with all possible matches acceptable, the benchmark for DA with full preferences
predicts no unmatched doctors. In contrast, the NRMP data indicates that 5.8%
of US seniors are unmatched. The first result from our simulations in Table 1
illustrates that the two-stage Int-DA process leads to a similar unmatched rate as
the NRMP. Doctors in our simulations are unmatched after the Int-DA process at
a 5.5% rate. Moreover, this proportion does not change substantially with either
market size or the common weight. In contrast, a direct truncation to the top-five
participants on the other side leads to substantially more unmatched participants.
Moreover, the unmatched rate grows sharply with increases to N and λ.
The next pair of results from the Int-DA simulations again match the NRMP
data: a large fraction of doctors are matched to top-ranked hospitals. Looking to
NRMP data from the past five years, 48% (73%) of US MD Seniors are matched
to their first-ranked (top-three–ranked) program. The Int-DA simulations again
indicate similarly-sized effects to the observed NRMP figures, at 40% (81%).14 In
contrast, the pure DA algorithm on the full preference lists implies substantially
lower rates of top-ranked outcomes, particularly in larger markets and as the com-
mon weight increases.
In the second panel of Table 1 we turn to other observed match outcomes.
These outcomes are not part of our explanation of reduced match ranks, but they
serve to evaluate the empirical relevance of our interviews model. The first out-
come is motivated by Roth and Peranson’s (1999) finding that NRMP data exhibit
14The Int-DA fraction matched to their first-ranked program does increase slightly as we increase
N , and decreases slightly as we increase λ.
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Table 1: Simulation Outcomes
N = 50 N = 1700
λ = 1/4 λ = 1/2 λ = 3/4 λ = 1/4 λ = 1/2 λ = 3/4
Panel A: Matching outcomes
Unmatched [DA: 0.0%,NRMP: 5.4%]†
Int-DA 5.7% 5.3% 4.4% 6.0% 5.8% 5.5%
Tr-DA 14.6% 39.9% 71.7% 24.2% 68.9% 95.4%
First-ranked program [NRMP: 48.1%]†
DA 16.1% 7.2% 3.6% 2.9% 0.6% 0.2%
Int-DA 42.8% 39.8% 34.6% 43.0% 41.5% 40.6%
Tr-DA 31.1% 12.2% 3.8% 24.1% 4.7% 0.3%
Top-three–ranked program match [NRMP: 73.2%]†
DA 41.3% 21.3% 10.2% 8.3% 2.0% 0.6%
Int-DA 81.9% 81.4% 80.7% 81.7% 81.3% 81.2%
Tr-DA 68.5% 38.6% 12.9% 57.5% 17.6% 1.7%
Panel B: Core size, similarity to DA, and stability
Same partner under proposer change [NRMP: 99.9%]‡
DA 60.9% 88.7% 93.9% 43.7% 95.0% 98.9%
Int-DA 98.4% 98.6% 97.6% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9%
Identical partner to DA
Int-DA 74.0% 80.8% 82.3% 73.4% 78.1% 77.0%
Proportion blocking programs in Int-DA
Matched 0.5% 0.8% 1.3% 0.1% 0.5% 1.7%
Unmatched 16.4% 20.3% 33.3% 10.0% 15.4% 32.6%
Note: †–Average for US MD Seniors in 2016–20. Source: Results and Data: 2020 Main Residency
Match, Table 15, available from nrmp.org. ‡–Figure reported for main NRMP match in Roth and
Peranson (1999). Smaller thoracic surgery market (N ' 120) has a 99.6 percent unique match for
five reported years in 1991–96 (ibid, tables 1 and 3).
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small cores. Using NRMP ranking data from the 1990s, they examine the change
in outcomes moving from the doctor- to the hospital-proposing DA. They find that
99.9% of doctors receive the same outcome—implying a unique stable partner. In
the same partner under proposer change rows we mirror this exercise. Our DA simu-
lations get close to the NRMP figure only in the larger markets with a heavy weight
on the common component. While most participants across each of the simula-
tions do have a unique stable partner, the minority with multiple partners are at
least an order of magnitude larger than in Roth and Peranson (1999). However,
changing the proposing side over the interview-truncated rankings from Int-DA
indicates much-closer effects to the NRMP field study. Indeed, for the N = 1700
markets we exactly replicate the given number across the three values of λ.
Our simulations of the Int-DA procedure show that it can reproduce stylized
results reflective of the observed NRMP figures—over unmatched rates, over the
fraction of first-ranked outcomes, and over the small cores found in rank-order list
data. Moreover, the Int-DA process does so generically, across market sizes and the
common-preference weights.
Given the fit with observed data regularities, a natural question regards the dif-
ference between outcomes under Int-DA and standard DA? The final set of results
in Table 1 speak to this question.
The identical partner to DA row directly contrasts the Int-DA and DA match out-
comes. Averaging across our parameterizations, we find that 78% of participants
in the Int-DA procedure are matched to the exact same partner they would match to
under DA with truthful preferences reports. While four of every five doctors are
entirely unaffected by the interview process, 22% of participants being affected is
far from negligible.
In the last section of Table 1 we evaluate the effects on stability. For each doctor
we calculate the proportion of programs they form a blocking pair with. We report
the average proportion, distinguishing between matched and unmatched doctors.
Matched doctors exhibit some instability, despite both stages in the two-stage pro-
cess being chosen to select stable outcomes. Averaging across parameterizations,
a blocking pair is detected for matched doctors 0.8% of the time. Unsurprisingly,
instabilities are more substantial for unmatched doctors. A randomly chosen hos-




Much of the matching literature has focused on the centralized clearinghouse
governing the match of newly-minted doctors and residency positions. We illus-
trate the possibility that decentralized interactions preceding the match—namely,
interviews—may dramatically impact ultimate outcomes.
For the NRMP, our results imply that empirical estimations based on prefer-
ences submitted to the clearinghouse should be used with great caution. More
broadly, beyond the NRMP, our paper suggests that interactions outside of the
clearinghouse can have dramatic effects on outcomes.
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A Proof of Proposition 2
A formal statement of Proposition 2 follows.
Proposition. Let kn ≥ 1 be a sequence of positive integers and M ≥ 1 be a constant.
Let ε,θ,π ∈ (0,1). Suppose that limsupkn/n < 1. Then there is N ∈N such that for all
n ≥N P (En) ≥ 1−π, where En is the set of ch, cd , ηd,h and ηh,d such that in the resulting
market (Dn,Hn,Un), for a fraction of at least 1−θ of doctors d, the rank-order of µIn(d)
in her interview-truncated preference is lower by at least M than the rank-order of any
hospital generating utility of at most ud(µDAn (d))− ε in her actual preference d .
Proof. Note that if k′n is in the hypotheses of the proposition, so is k
′
n+M. So replace
kn by kn +M in the sequel. With some notational abuse, we drop the multipliers
λD in 1−λD and write cd for λDcd , ηd,h for (1−λD)ηd,h, etc. This re-scaling implies
that utilities are sums of the common and private value components: und (h) = ch +
ηd,h, and u
n
h (d) = cd + ηh,d . The relevant probability distributions are re-scaled
correspondingly, but remain absolutely continuous, with support on a compact
interval in R. Without loss, we assume that this interval is [0,1].15
Let D = ∪nDn and H = ∪nHn. Consider tuples (c,η), with c = (ca)a∈H∪D and
η = ((ηa,b)(a,b)∈H×D , (ηa,b)(a,b)∈D×H ).
15In fact, the distributions do not need to have a compact support. It suffices to choose a compact
set that accumulates large enough probability. We thank SangMok Lee for this observation.
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The tuples (c,d) are endowed with the product probability measure from the i.i.d.
distributions described above.
Let G denote the cumulative distribution function corresponding to cd and fix
θ,ε,π > 0.
To understand how the proof works, note that if agents match assortatively
based on the common component, then a doctor d should be able to find a hospital
h for which it has idiosyncratic utility close to 1, and this hospital should provide
d with (approximately) the same utility cd + 1 as it receives from matching with d.
Think of cd + 1 as d’s “target utility.”
Let
An(ε, (c,η)) = {d ∈Dn : cd + 1− ε < ud(µDAn (d)) < cd + 1 + ε}
be the set of doctors for which this is achieved (in DA), up to ε. We shall prove that,
when n is large enough, with large probability, a fraction at least 1 − θ/2 doctors
are in An(ε, (c,η)).
Consider the number of hospitals ranked above a doctor’s target utility cd + 1.
Let kn ≥ 1 be a sequence of positive integers such that limsupkn/n < 1. Let
B(cd ,n) = {
∣∣∣h ∈Hn : ch + ηd,h > cd + 1∣∣∣ ≤ kn}.
be the event that fewer than kn hospitals give d a utility greater than d’s target
utility. We denote by βn the probability that a fraction of at least θ/2 doctors have
a “small” number of at most kn hospitals above their target utility.




∣∣∣An(ε, (c,η))∣∣∣ ≥ 1 −
θ/2
)
> 1 − π/2. Thus, the event that B(cd ,n) is false for a fraction ≥ 1 − θ/2 of
doctors and the event
(
1
n |An(ε, (c,ε))| ≥ 1−θ/2
)
holds, has probability ≥ (1−π/2) +
(1 − π/2) − 1 = 1 − π. At the intersection of these events, it holds for a fraction
≥ (1−θ/2)+(1−θ/2)−1 = 1−θ of d ∈Dn that B(cd ,n) is false and d ∈ An(ε). Hence,
for a fraction ≥ 1−θ of d ∈ Dn there are more than kn hospitals above their target
utility, and they are within ε of their target utilities. The rank-order of any partner
in µI is at most kn, so these statements prove the proposition.






and recall that l ∈ [0,1) by hypothesis. Choose c? and δ > 0 such that 1−G(c?)+δ <
θ/4 and l < P (ch + ηd,h > c? + 1). This is possible by absolute continuity of the
distributions of ch and ηd,h. Let p(c?) = P (ch + ηd,h > c? + 1).
If cd ≤ c? , then















by Hoeffding’s inequality (observe that, eventually, p(c?)− knn > 0).
Let
βn = P (|{d ∈Dn : B(cd ,n)}| > nθ/2)
≤ P

∣∣∣{d ∈Dn : B(d,n) and cd ≤ c?}∣∣∣︸                                ︷︷                                ︸
Zn
+






Zn + 1−G(c?) + δ > θ/2) + P (
1
n
Yn > 1−G(c?) + δ)
The first inequality follows by counting all d with cd > c? as if B(d,n) were true. So
the random variable Yn counts all d ∈Dn with cd > c? as if they were in B(cd ,n).
The second inequality is a truncation exercise, partitioning the probability
space into two events. The first event is 1nYn ≤ 1−G(c
?) +δ and the second is 1nYn >
1−G(c?)+δ. Under the second event, we have 1nZn+
1
nYn > θ/2 as 1−G(c
?)+δ > θ/2.
Under the first event, the inequality is obtained by “raising” 1nYn to 1−G(c
?) + δ.




Yn > 1−G(c?) + δ) ≤ exp(−2δ2n). (2)
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Now,









where the first inequality follows as n(θ/2− (1−G(c?)+δ)) ≥ 1, and the probability
of B(d,n) is maximized by setting cd = c? .
Choose n such that
n(θ/2− [1−G(c?) + δ]) > 1, (4)
exp(−2δ2n) < π/4, (5)
nexp(−2(p(c?)− kn
n




∣∣∣An(ε, (c,η))∣∣∣ ≥ 1−θ/2) > 1−π/2. (7)
Observe that (4) is possible as θ/2−[1−G(c?)+δ] > 0. Inequality (6) requires that k is
O(n), which holds by hypothesis, and our choice of c? to ensure that p(c?)−kn/n > 0
is eventually bounded below. Inequality (7) is possible by Theorem 1 of Lee (2016).




)2n) + exp(−2δ2n) < π/2 (8)
Statements (7) and (8) provide the two bounds needed. ‖
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For Online Publication–Appendix: Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proposition 1
Proof. Let  be the common preference that doctors have over hospitals. Note that
DA is the same as serial dictatorship (SD) with the order dictated by hospital rank
in .
Consider a doctor d assigned to h = µDA(d) in the rth round of SD. The rank-
order of h in d’s preference is therefore r. If k ≤ r then we are done, as the rank-
order of µI (d) in d’s truncated preference is at most k.
Suppose that r < k. Two observations follow. First, consider the interview stage
and a hospital h = µDA(d) matched to d in stage r ′ < k of DA. When choosing whom
to interview, h can choose any doctor, as all of them would have received strictly
fewer than k interview requests when they get a request from h. So the hospital
choosing at stage r ′ of DA will interview the highest k doctors in her preference.
Second, µDA(h) = µI (h) for the hospital h choosing at round r.16 This is shown
by induction: The statement is obviously true for the highest ranked hospital.
Suppose that µDA(h) = µI (h) for all hospitals choosing at any stage r ′ < r. If h is
the r-ranked hospital then the set of doctors available to h in the DA stage of Int-
DA is D, by our first observation, minus the choices of hospitals with rank-order
r ′ < r. By the inductive hypothesis the doctors chosen by the hospitals with rank-
order r ′ < r is the same as DA. So the set of available doctors to hospital h is the
same in Int-DA as in DA. Thus µDA(h) = µI (h). ‖
A.2 Proposition 3
Proof. Specifically, we show that there are constants N , K , K ′, K ′′ and K ′′′ that do
not depend on θ and π, such that for all


















the statement in Proposition 2 holds.
16Incidentally this may not happen for hospitals choosing at round r ′ > k. It is easy to come up
with examples.
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The market size in the proof of Proposition 2 is determined from inequali-
ties (4)-(7). These are the starting point of the proof. Using the bounds in Lee
(2016), these mean that we need to choose n such that
−2[p(c?)− kn
n
























1/4−4 ≥ 1− π
2
, (13)
where gn is o(e−
√
n logn)
For (9), choose N0 and K0 such that if n ≥ N0 then (p(c?) − kn/n)2 ≤ K0. This is
possible given the hypothesis that limsupkn/n < 1. Next, let N1 ≥ N0 and K1 be












2 − (1−G(c?))− δ
(16)
































Let N2 ≥ N1 be such that for all n ≥ N2, 1√n −
3
n1/4








For (13), fix N3 ≥ N2 and K4 such that for all n ≥ N3 1− gn ≥ K4. So we need to
obtain log(1− π2 )) ≤ (2n









Set N̄ = N3, K = K2 K ′ = (1 −G(c?)) + δ, K ′′ = K ′′′ = 1/16. Then the calculations
above correspond to (14), (15), (16), (17), and (18). ‖
B For Online Publication–Appendix: Additional Fig-
ures
Figure B.1: NRMP residents matched to first-ranked program (conditional on
matching)
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